

CPDE Working Paper

**Accelerating the
implementation of the
Istanbul Principles
by INGOs in a changing
development landscape**

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Introduction

In September 2010, more than 170 representatives from 82 countries unanimously adopted the *Istanbul Principles for Civil Society Organisations Development Effectiveness*. The eight *Istanbul Principles* are the result of consultations with thousands of civil society organisations (CSOs) globally in 2009-2010. In June 2011, the *International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness* was also adopted at the Second Global Assembly of the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The *Framework* sets out guidance for interpreting and aligning CSO practices with the *Istanbul Principles (IPs)* in the diverse local and sectoral settings.

Today, the advancement of an effective development cooperation framework, particularly in relation to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, is core to the agenda of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), the successor of the Open Forum and the Better Aid Platform. Full and effective implementation of CSO development effectiveness by putting in practice the *Istanbul Principles* is an essential dimension of this agenda and it underlies CPDE's dialogue with development actors through engagement with the Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness.

Purpose

This working paper aims to build on the *International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness* nine years since the adoption of the *Istanbul Principles*. By reflecting on emerging trends in development affecting international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and exploring key challenges to INGO development effectiveness, we aimed to contextualise and actualise guidance for INGOs on how to accelerate progress towards putting in practice the *Istanbul Principles*.

Taking a study conducted by the CPDE INGO constituency group in 2016 as a starting point, we identify four out of the eight effectiveness principles that INGOs have so far found more challenging to implement fully. These principles are:

- » IP 3 Focus on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation
- » IP4 Promote environmental sustainability
- » IP5 Practice transparency and accountability
- » IP6 Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity

For each of these principles, the paper sets out:

- » Key barriers to implementation
- » Opportunities for moving forward informed by new examples of good practices
- » Ways forward for capitalising on emerging opportunities
- » Learning questions to guide further internal dialogue and reflection in INGOs

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PART 1

Setting the context: emerging trends and drivers affecting INGOs implementation of the Istanbul Principles

Since the adoption of the *Istanbul Principles* in 2010 and of the *International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness* in 2011, the world, and consequently the development landscape, has changed considerably. Today, the universal nature of the problems we face, and the goals we aspire to, is taken as a given. The adoption of Agenda 2030 in 2016 contributed to this, marking a significant shift in the level of ambition from the preceding Millennium Development Goals. The universal rhetoric is enshrined in the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which set shared targets for people, planet and prosperity recognising that “*eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions*” is a global challenge and a precondition for sustainable development. Despite the inspirational transformative vision embodied in Agenda 2030, there appears to be a growing disconnect between this rhetoric and the realities on the ground.

This section illustrates five global trends that are contributing to shape the development landscape and the operating environment for civil society organisations (CSOs) in general. This helps us frame our assessment of the challenges facing CSOs – and particularly international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) - today, which impact on their ability to put the *Istanbul Principles* into practice. These global trends are not new. However, since 2010 they have deepened and evolved requiring INGOs to adapt and change the way in which they operate in order to deliver their missions while staying true to the core principles of the development effectiveness agenda.

TREND 1 - The impact of the “Beyond Aid” agenda

Key takeaways

- » Global ODA flows are diminishing and aid is less aligned with poverty eradication geographical, sectoral and thematic priorities. This limits CSOs’ ability to deliver their poverty eradication mandates.
- » Although total funding for CSOs has continued to increase in absolute terms since 2015, its relative importance (as a share of total ODA) has not.
- » While more funding has been channelled through INGOs - relative to northern and southern national CSOs - overall funding to INGOs (i.e. core funding) has fallen. This poses a challenge to INGO independence, to their ability to innovate and to their longer-term sustainability.
- » Growing engagement by corporates and private sector actors as a result of the ‘Beyond Aid’ agenda is contributing to re-shape the development discourse as well as national rules and policies. This poses new challenges – as well as some opportunities - for national and international CSOs.

The notion of development cooperation itself and the traditional aid model, where resources are transferred from developed to underdeveloped countries, are being increasingly questioned. Following the adoption of Agenda 2030, traditional development actors and many national governments have promoted a profound shift in the development discourse with a view to mobilising unprecedented levels of funding to resource the SDGs. This has become known as the “Beyond Aid” agenda². It aims to progress from leveraging “billions to trillions” of mostly non concessional

resources through a diverse range of financing instruments and modalities involving actors largely outside the traditional aid system. This agenda perceives traditional aid – or ODA – as a partly outdated instrument, which needs to be “modernised” in order to tackle new and emerging challenges such as climate change or security and migration, while also supporting infrastructure development through public/private partnerships. Although it is recognised that ODA may still play an important role in the poorest and most fragile countries in the world, in other contexts it is merely considered as a catalytic agent in the mobilisation of private finance for development³.

The “Beyond Aid” agenda engenders a wider shift in development cooperation. This centres on the diminishing quantity and deteriorating quality of ODA for poverty eradication, hereby undermining its true potential. It also encompasses other aspects such as growing private sector engagement and the reshaping of rules and policies, which also impinge on CSO development effectiveness. We elaborate on these specific aspects below.

Global ODA is diminishing, it is being re-purposed and is deteriorating in quality




Fig.1 – Trend in ODA net flows 2010-2018 - OECD DAC

Real ODA (discounting in-donor costs for refugees and students) has grown by a very modest 2% annually since 2010 from USD109 billion to USD126 billion in 2017⁴. Preliminary figures for 2018 from the OECD show that ODA actually fell 2.7% from 2017 (USD 149.3 billion), with a declining share going to the neediest countries⁵. The drop is explained by the OECD as being largely due to less aid being spent on hosting refugees as arrivals slowed and rules were tightened on which refugee costs can come out of official aid budgets. However, even if aid spent on processing and hosting refugees is excluded, data shows ODA stagnating from 2017 to 2018. Most concerning, OECD data show that bilateral ODA to the least-developed countries fell by 3% in real terms from 2017, aid to Africa fell by 4%, and humanitarian aid fell by 8%.

The long-standing ODA target of 0.7% of providers' GNI continues to be far-fetched. The ODA figure for 2018 is equivalent to only 0.31% of the DAC donors' combined gross national income. Had the international community met the 0.7% target in 2017, we could have counted on a total of USD325 billion in aid, which at three times the current ODA budget, could have provided a substantial contribution towards the realisation of the SDGs.

This new data from the OECD confirms growing concerns expressed by CSOs globally that ODA flows are not only diminishing but that aid is less aligned with poverty eradication geographic, sectoral and thematic priorities. As further explored below, this contributes to eroding CSOs' development effectiveness limiting their ability to deliver their poverty eradication mandates.

ODA is increasingly diverted to in-country priorities and expenditures crowding INGOs out

A combination of political and economic trends over recent years have contributed to the demise of the traditional aid model. Among these, the resurgence of neo-liberal policies since the 2008 global economic crisis has led to significant reductions in public sector spending in many countries worldwide. This has coincided with mounting pressure on many governments to reduce taxes and re-focus on national priorities, heeding the demands of vocal populist movements. These trends have resulted in a significant squeeze on national budgets in several major donor countries and consequently to the stagnation, or reduction of, real (qualitative) aid budgets.

As a result of this, since 2010 there has been a growing tendency by donors to either re-purpose and/or inflate ODA through DAC-allowable budgetary additions to ODA which go beyond aid transfers to developing countries aimed at poverty eradication. What we witnessed in the early 2000s with debt cancellation contributions distorting real aid budgets, we are now seeing with in-donor country expenditures for refugees, which amounted to almost USD14 billion, or 10% of ODA, in 2017. These, however, have decreased in 2018 as arrivals slowed down.

Climate finance has been another way for donors to inflate their aid budgets. Climate finance makes up a significant and growing part of real ODA of three of the world's five top donors with Germany (20%) in the lead, followed by Japan (18%) and France (9%)⁶. These funds, however, are seldom new or additional as donors tend to re-purpose existing ODA as climate finance. In addition, a significant share of these resources are disbursed in the form of non-concessional loans often going to middle income countries and focusing on mitigation but less so on adaptation interventions.

INGOs have traditionally been less engaged in in-country actions to support migrants and refugees and in the delivery of climate finance (representing only 5% of total ODA climate finance from 2010 to 2016 and 15% of adaptation climate finance⁷). This has left many INGOs needing to adapt by partly re-aligning their programming to these emerging priorities against a backdrop of diminishing resources and political support for development cooperation beyond humanitarian assistance.

Allocations to INGO core sectoral issues are diminishing

The proportion of Real ODA directed to those sectors that are most important for poverty reduction - and most relevant for INGOs - has remained largely unchanged (36%) from 2010 to 2017⁸ regardless of the Agenda 2030 "leave no one behind" rhetoric. This means that funding from donors for core operational sectors for INGOs (e.g. education, primary health care, sexual and reproductive health, water and sanitation, food security, peace-building, fostering women's rights and democratic participation, agriculture and SMEs) has not grown on a par with the new level of ambition set by the SDGs.

Similarly, although humanitarian assistance has increased as a share of Real ODA and also relative to donor allocations through CSOs as a share of total allocations through CSOs, it still falls far short of what is required. This increase in resources for humanitarian assistance has also contributed to putting pressure on donor support for long term development priorities through CSOs. In fact, aid directed at fostering gender equality and women's empowerment and aid for long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa have also stagnated in real terms. All this has contributed to limit INGOs' ability to mobilise additional finance for key interventions as part of their core poverty eradication work.

ODA is increasingly channelled through - but not to - INGOs

A comparative study looking at six European countries⁹ (Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) has revealed that although total funding for CSOs has continued to increase in absolute terms since 2015, its relative importance (as a share of total ODA) has not. A closer look at OECD DAC disaggregated statistics on ODA finance through different types of CSOs allows us to get a more granular picture of what is actually going on. The data show that while international NGOs have increased their share of ODA that is channelled to and through them from 17% in 2010 to 25% in 2016, the share for developing country-based CSOs has stagnated at a mere 6% and that for donor-country based CSOs has instead fallen from 77% to 69% in the same period¹⁰. This may well have contributed to entrenching the – real or perceived - dominant role of INGOs vis-à-vis national CSOs in the north and south affecting INGO downward accountability and perpetuating unequal power dynamics with southern partners.

The study also found that ODA funding channelled *through* CSOs (i.e. funding that is programmed by the donor government) remains far more important in volume than ODA channelled *directly to* CSOs (i.e. that is programmed by CSOs themselves). This is likely to be a result of a shift in national governments' perception of role of CSOs - especially INGOs – from partners to implementers and it has important implications on their ability to freely allocate resources, limiting their independence, their ability to innovate and their longer-term sustainability.

Growing engagement by corporates and private sector actors at the global and national level is contributing to re-shape the development agenda

Within the framework of the “Beyond Aid” agenda, ODA allocations aimed at leveraging private capital flows for development are growing. In order to convert investments for development from “billions to trillions”, the door to private sector engagement in development is now wide open. This has been fostered by the creation of various Private Sector Instruments, and the establishment of specialised Development Finance Institutions in a growing number of donor countries including the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. Private sector engagement has been fostered through proactive corporate centred solutions and strategies both at the national and global level with the international financial institutions, the regional banks and the UN leading the way. ODA allocations increasingly mirror this trend. An ODA “private sector proxy” indicates that the overall share of ODA allocated to sectors oriented to the private sector rose from 21% in 2010 to 26% in 2016¹¹. It is most concerning to note that, in the same year, almost half (47%) of EU ODA was disbursed to these sectors¹².

Other concerning aspects of private sector penetration in development have been the active promotion by national governments of public-private partnerships, despite well-documented negative assessments of their efficiency and effectiveness in financing the public sector, and the recent emphasis on “blended finance”. The latter refers to “*the strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance (i.e. commercial finance) towards sustainable development in developing countries*”¹³. According to the OECD, 17 DAC members now employ various forms of blended finance. Since 2000, DAC members have created 167 mechanisms for pooling public finance with private capital, most of which were created after 2010. It is estimated that these mechanisms have helped mobilise USD81 billion in private sector finance from 2012 to 2015¹⁴. Nevertheless, the OECD's own observations¹⁵ and other recent reports^{16,17} on blended finance have raised a number of issues regarding its weak development effectiveness and poverty focus, poor transparency, unclear additionality and potential conditionality among others.

Many CSOs are concerned about what they see as the ‘corporate capture’ of the development agenda as they argue that it has tended to override people’s welfare for profit generation causing human rights violations. Despite sharing these legitimate concerns about large corporates, others are partnering with private actors such as pharma companies to leverage funding for public health (e.g. Save the Children, Comic Relief); or with tech companies to enhance the delivery of basic services and humanitarian action using new technologies (e.g. Oxfam, ICRC) for example.

TREND 2 – Growing conditionalities and compliance in support of donor governments’ short-term national interests

Key takeaways

- » Today, increasingly inward-looking national governments are openly pursuing their own, short-term economic interests and foreign policy priorities over promoting sustainable development.
- » The re-alignment of development cooperation policies and instruments to donor government interests (e.g. migration control) poses a serious challenge for international NGOs potentially influencing the nature and focus of their partnerships with local actors.
- » Similarly, the need to comply with stringent scrutiny from donors is affecting the way in which INGOs plan and conduct their operations, the terms of their relationships with partners, and it limits their voice and independence.

Today, increasingly inward-looking national governments are openly pursuing their own, short-term economic interests and foreign policy priorities over promoting sustainable development. Following the lead of Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, many other governments have embraced an “us Vs. them” discourse that sees tackling poverty and security at home (or being seen to do so) taking precedence over global poverty eradication. Others have taken a more nuanced stance framing development cooperation as being about ‘mutual interest’, or a ‘win-win’ instrument. Nonetheless, this is likely to ultimately lead to the donors’ own interests prevailing over the interests of partner countries. All this is occurring against the backdrop of an increasingly de-legitimised multilateral system and weakened public support for CSOs.

The re-emergence of tied aid?

As a result of this trend, we are seeing the strategic re-focusing of development cooperation policies and instruments as is presently the case in the EU, the UK and the US, for example. Concerningly, this is leading to the re-emergence of conditionality in relations between donor countries and developing countries. For example, there is a push for European countries to enter into “re-admission agreements” with migrants’ countries of origin, mostly in Africa. These agreements include migration “management” and “control” mechanisms in countries of origin as well support for the reintegration of returned migrants. It is feared by CSOs that the proposed restructuring of the EU budget for development cooperation from 2021 will facilitate the direction of additional development funds to address “irregular migration” at the expense of other poverty eradication interventions. Will CSOs be forced to comply with these new policies in order to access scarce resources for essential interventions in what are increasingly perceived as ‘countries of origin’ for poor, low-skilled migrants heading for other countries? How will this affect international NGOs potentially influencing the nature and focus of their partnerships with local actors going forward?

Stringent donor compliance and scrutiny stifling CSO development effectiveness

The new political realities facing CSOs in many countries around the world have led to a notable change in how they are perceived by national governments. Rather than wishing to partner with national and international CSOs, enabling them to programme their resources according to their priorities, national governments increasingly view national CSOs as service providers and INGOs merely as project implementers or conduits for funding southern actors. As a result of dwindling aid budgets and austerity policies, donor approaches favouring value for money considerations and short-term, results-based financing have prevailed while the provision of no-strings-attached, core funding to CSOs has gradually disappeared. This has been coupled with the introduction of restrictive anti-

terrorism and security measures primarily aimed at controlling civil society actors. The emphasis on delivering results and on compliance has placed a straightjacket on CSOs paradoxically making them less effective. National CSOs and INGOs have borne the brunt of these policies, facing increasingly stringent scrutiny from donors affecting the way in which they plan and conduct their operations, the terms of their relationships with partners, and by limiting their voice and independence¹⁸.

The negative consequences of this on CSO development effectiveness have been highlighted for the UK in a recent review¹⁹ by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), which has criticised the UK government's Department for International Development for its lack of commitment to understanding the wider contexts CSOs operate in, as well as its complex approach to funding. ICAI has found that the end of UK's government's Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) with CSOs and the focus on delivering results reduces "CSOs' opportunities for self-driven capacity development, longer-term strategic thinking and adaptation to the evolving contexts in which they operated." Moreover, ICAI found that UK CSOs' flexibility is restricted by higher planning and reporting costs, which also means that innovation and sustainability are hindered, as a result of the government's excessive focus on compliance.

TREND 3 - An increasingly hostile environment for civil society organisations

Key takeaways

- » The narrowing and closing of civic space has accelerated since 2010 and it is now a global phenomenon affecting every region.
- » We are witnessing a new systematic crackdown on civil society ushered by the rise of authoritarian governments in many countries around the world.
- » An increasingly hostile environment undermines CSO development effectiveness: it erodes public trust in CSOs by de-legitimising and stigmatising them; it silences dissenting CSO voices both in the north and south through enhanced surveillance, stringent regulations, closing opportunities for public debate and violent reprisals against human rights defenders; it weakens INGOs' ability to foster truly democratic ownership and equal partnerships with local actors.

CSOs play a vital role in pursuing people-centred development, enabling people to claim their rights, shaping development policies and partnerships, and pursuing accountability in implementation. Open civic space and people's participation are essential preconditions for the achievement of Agenda 2030. Yet, the shrinking and closing of civic space is a growing global phenomenon affecting every region and very different countries from the poorest to the richest, from the most undemocratic to the seemingly democratic.

The tendency by governments to enact policies and legislation to silence voices of dissent is not new, especially in less democratic contexts. However, since the turn of the millennium we have witnessed a far more pervasive and systematic crackdown on civic space. This has worsened since 2010. According to data compiled by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit-Law, 72 countries have proposed or enacted more than 144 restrictions on civil society since 2012²⁰. The space for civil society is now under serious attack in 111 of the world's countries – well over half – and only four per cent of the world's population live in countries where our fundamental civil society freedoms – of association, peaceful assembly and expression – are respected²¹.

How did we get here? The 1990s were the peak of a 'golden era' for CSOs. This came to an abrupt end after the attacks of September 11th 2001 and the launch of the "War on terror" by US President George Bush Jr. This marked a shift in the public perception of civil society actors, and international CSOs in particular, whose reputation was tainted by their possible association with international terrorism. In this context, governments felt empowered to enact legislation restricting civic space. A second crackdown came in the aftermath of the "Arab Spring" after 2010²². Some believe that we are now on the cusp of a third wave of restrictions on CSOs marked by the rise of ideological and religious extremism resulting in an increasingly hostile environment for human rights defenders and advocates globally. The narrowing of civic space is increasingly affecting INGOs – as well as national CSOs - in their countries of origin as well as in those where they work.

The following emerging trends have been identified by CSOs and human rights defenders in both the global north and the global south:

- » **Proliferation of restrictive laws and regulations:** Governments have long used laws and regulations as repressive tools to undermine, harass and marginalise CSOs. New laws and regulations are actively limiting the ability of CSOs – and especially INGOs - to form, operate, and sustain themselves. For example, in Nepal, INGOs cannot be registered (and cannot operate without being registered) unless they commit to spending \$200,000 USD per year in Nepal. In Pakistan, recent INGO regulations have prevented several INGOs from being able to register and/or carry out their work. In Cambodia, INGOs are required to be “politically neutral” and to undergo a complex registration process²³. Governments are also increasingly restricting CSOs’ ability to engage in advocacy and lobbying (e.g. in the United Kingdom and Ireland), to use information and communication technology, and to access international development cooperation.
- » **Growing limitations on access to funding:** Transparency-linked regulatory and funding restrictions for CSOs are on the rise. These force increasingly burdensome requirements on CSOs for the reporting and disclosure of private information (e.g. in Bulgaria, Panama, Uganda), private assets of CSO directors (e.g. in Ukraine and India), private and official international sources of funding (e.g. in Hungary and Mexico) alongside disproportionate penalties for non-compliance (e.g. in Egypt and Russia).
- » **The emergence of cyber harassment and surveillance:** This is an emerging form of control which targets the use of social media and other digital communications and exchange as a powerful new vehicle for surveillance, harassment and the spread of false information and demonisation. This is enabled by new cybercrime laws, anti-terrorism legislation and regulations that provide unfettered power to governments including for example in Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia and Tanzania.
- » **Closing down policy dialogue and access to information:** Limiting CSO access to quality policy dialogue – especially for dissenting voices – both at the national level and in multilateral fora. In a recent example, the ECOSOC’s NGO Committee again denied the Committee to Protect Journalists’ application for status after it had already deferred decision on the application for four years; the decision was only overturned after an 11th hour direct global appeal to ECOSOC’s Coordination and Management meeting²⁴. Preventing CSO representatives from travelling abroad is another increasingly prevalent tactic. Examples include Bahrain, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Timely access to public policy documentation, processes and budgets is an essential pre-condition for effective policy dialogue.
- » **Rising systematic violence against human rights defenders:** CSOs and human rights defenders have been subject to increasing threats, intimidation and reprisals to limit their ability to speak up in multilateral fora, such as the UN Human Rights Council. There has been a rise in organised violence, including assassinations, against human rights defenders across the world. Women human rights defenders have also been increasingly subjected to sexual and gender-based violence.
- » **Growing public intolerance:** This has been associated with rising religious fundamentalism and political intolerance coupled with the rise of political populist movements. It has contributed to further restricting the space for vulnerable groups, including especially women and girls as well as the LGBTI community, to make their voices heard and restricting access to the full enjoyment of their sexual and reproductive rights. One of the most troubling examples of this was Brazil’s election in 2018 of Jair Bolsonaro as president, after he ran on a viciously misogynist, homophobic and anti-rights platform, bringing immediate setbacks for many in civil society. Viktor Orbán’s toxic ‘pro-Hungarian’ and anti-foreign narrative, which is couched in traditionalist, pragmatist (i.e. increasing population numbers to the benefit of the labour market and social security) and misconceived religious ideology is another example of how this tactic can be used to erode human rights and attack civil society.
- » **The spread of stigmatisation and de-legitimation:** Systematic stigmatisation and de-legitimation of CSOs, human rights defenders and in some cases CSO donors (e.g. the anti-Soros campaign in Hungary) as self-serving, “foreign-influenced”, “foreign assets” or as threats to the stability of the nation is spreading to more countries further narrowing civic space for CSOs even in established democracies such as Italy for example. According to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer²⁵ trust in NGOs in 2017 was at its lowest since 2001.

TREND 4 - Shifting power dynamics in development cooperation and civil society

Key takeaways

- » Decentralisation – or localisation and people-to-people – agendas are emerging as local actors take – spontaneous or facilitated – joint action to address the challenges they face.
- » The shift in power away from traditional gate-keepers including INGOs is disrupting their operating models and will require the reframing and refocusing of partnerships with national and local responders.
- » It is yet unclear whether the devolution of power and governance of many large INGO ‘families’ in recent years has genuinely contributed to strengthening their development effectiveness or not.

Decentralising – or localising - power and ownership of development initiatives has grown considerably in recent years inspired by the conviction that local resources, as well as leadership and buy-in from local actors are necessary pre-conditions for effective development cooperation. There is a huge amount of energy and innovation going on in civil society, public services and the new economy. People and organisations are experimenting with new ways of deciding things and doing things – new forms of collaborative action or people to people approaches – much of it accelerated by new digital technologies and social media. So, local authorities are experimenting with citizens’ assemblies (e.g. Ireland) and participatory budget making (e.g. Spain); political movements are using digital platforms promoting direct democracy (e.g. the 5 stars movement in Italy); communities are setting up self-help groups for pressing needs like adult social care in northern countries; people are combining to provide for their energy needs (e.g. Italy) or to share their resources and/or time (e.g. the Qogelelais traditional approach in Zimbabwe). Another example of this is the growth of community philanthropy which has often emerged from people’s disengagement or disenchantment with the traditional development aid model, harnessing ‘people power’ to respond to community needs. Examples include the Kenya Community Development Foundation, the Community Foundation for the Western Region of Zimbabwe (CFWRZ) which has established a direct two-way learning partnership with the Romanian community foundation PACT, and Tewa – the Nepal Women’s Trust, which raises over half its funds from Nepal and mobilised a network of women ‘shadow barefoot volunteers’. In the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake.

Among the donor community, the European Union pioneered decentralisation when in 2004 it devolved programming and implementation of its aid programme to in-country Delegations while increasingly investing in local civil society strengthening. The humanitarian sector has built on this trend by instigating the localisation agenda and initiatives such as the Grand Bargain since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The Grand Bargain commits donors and aid organizations to provide 25% of global humanitarian funding (from only 2% in 2016) to local and national responders by 2020, along with more un-earmarked money, and increased multi-year funding to ensure greater predictability and continuity in humanitarian response, among other commitments.

This agenda signals an important shift in power away from international actors as well as traditional gate-keepers including INGOs. As such, it also poses a challenge to INGOs that have been at the forefront of humanitarian and development action, requiring the reframing and refocusing of partnerships with national and local responders. In this context, many think that INGOs should take a step back and assume more of a brokering, facilitating and capacitating role vis-à-vis local responders and actors indirectly supporting interventions on the ground while directly raising awareness of the issues with audiences and decision makers in the North.

Many large INGOs are not new to the concept of de-centralisation of power or governance. Action Aid was one of the early adopters of this concept when in the early 2000s it transferred its headquarters from London to Johannesburg and it established a global federation with a view to distributing power more evenly across all the members of the ‘family’. Over the past decade, most large international NGOs such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, World Vision and Save the Children have followed in Action Aid’s footsteps to varying degrees. They have implemented different federative models aimed at shifting their power base from the global north to the global south, closer to the ground and affected communities. However, few have gone as far as Action Aid in empowering country teams with decision making at board level²⁶.

It therefore remains to be seen whether the ‘localisation’ of large INGO families has contributed to strengthening their development effectiveness or not. Some believe this move has contributed to making INGOs more relevant, authentic, efficient, more agile, better informed and more accountable²⁷. Others have argued that there needs to be more equitable sharing of power, knowledge and resources between the INGOs and local organisations to achieve real transformation on the ground. The recognition²⁸ by INGOs themselves that they have lagged behind in putting in practice the *Istanbul Principles* associated with people’s empowerment, democratic ownership, equitable partnerships, accountability and transparency, as documented by the CPDE INGO constituency study from 2016, confirms that more work will be required in these areas.

TREND 5 – Harnessing the power of digital transformation

Key takeaways

- » Advancing digital disruption and the speed of technological innovations will require CSOs to look at the big picture and fundamentally rethink their roles and mandates.
- » The emergence of digital innovations and platforms is challenging INGO traditional business models and value chains, accelerating their disintermediation.
- » Increased connectivity allows for a new dimension of interaction between INGOs and stakeholders potentially fostering improved accountability, transparency and more equitable partnerships.

We are witnessing a rapidly evolving – and uneven - process of digitalisation. This includes increased connectivity and interactivity and the spread of digital devices, digital data and data analytics, in conjunction with growth in digitally enabled applications and services. This so called Fourth Industrial Revolution will continue to accelerate the introduction of game-changing technologies and is expected to change society as we know it. The rate of change today and the speed of technological advancements will require CSOs to look at the big picture and fundamentally rethink their roles and mandates, acquire new capacities and skills, and transition to organisational, partnership and funding models that will allow them to become more empowered, agile and informed agents for social good.

Many have already embraced emerging technologies to pioneer new ways to fulfil their missions. Algorithms are being used for predictive modelling of cholera outbreaks and to supply vaccines; the World Food Programme has used distributed ledgers – blockchain - for the provision of cash transfers and resources to refugees in Pakistan; unmanned aerial vehicles have been used by Gavi to deliver vital medical supplies in hard-to-reach areas in Rwanda; and VR (virtual reality) technologies have been used by WWF to create immersive experiences that highlight issues such as environmental conservation in ways that were not possible before.




Fig.2 – Digital transformation mega trends - DALBERG

Increased connectivity and digital platforms are already changing work patterns, weakening workers' rights with more flexible but less secure contracts, changing customer expectations and challenging business models. In many ways, digital innovations such as direct giving (e.g. Kiva, Give Directly) and the emergence of digital platforms such as Change.org are accelerating the disintermediation of more traditional INGOs. At the same time, increased connectivity allows for a new dimension of interaction between CSOs and stakeholders including supporters, partners, and affected communities. Platforms such as Accountable Now, through their Digital Accountability project, or IATI (International Aid Transparency Initiative) are harnessing the power of new technologies to foster CSO accountability and transparency.

If not governed appropriately, technological change risks creating new inequalities (e.g. quality of access, connectivity speed); reinforcing existing ones (based on geography, age, poverty, gender, disability); and may be used to exert an increasing level of control on individuals and organisations jeopardising data safety and privacy (e.g. digital totalitarianism and cyber surveillance). There is a huge need for civil society involvement in influencing how the Fourth Industrial Revolution unfolds and how, on the one hand, its positive impacts can be directed towards those whose lives INGOs are aiming to improve, and on the other hand, how its negative impacts can be prevented.

PART 2

Accelerating progress on the ‘left behind’ Istanbul Principles

Testing times ahead for INGOs

All the trends identified in Part 1 of this paper have a significant bearing on the ability by CSOs, and particularly INGOs, to maintain and enhance their development effectiveness going forward. In a rapidly changing world and operating environment, the future of international NGOs is uncertain. More and more INGOs find it hard to sustain growth levels faced with an increasingly regulated, diminishing and competitive funding environment. Civic space is closing faster than ever and many INGOs that appeared to be beyond criticism, today find themselves caught up now in public and political rows about mismanagement, high salaries, weak accountability and safeguarding that are contributing to discredit the sector. With trust in INGOs plummeting in many countries and traditional aid models being upended, what is clear is that business as usual is not going to cut it. INGOs should be asking themselves hard questions about their role and added value. They should be re-imagining their business models and their value chains. They ought to re-negotiate existing partnerships and seek innovative ones in order to harness the power of disruptive technological change while mitigating against structural and political disruption.

Building on the progress made in advancing the development effectiveness agenda

The CPDE INGO constituency group published a study in 2016 that provided a snapshot of the progress made by INGOs in implementing the development effectiveness principles adopted in Istanbul in 2010. This study was not based on rigorous independent research but rather on a self-assessment exercise aimed at taking the temperature among INGOs within the framework of the development effectiveness agenda. It found that the majority of INGOs were aware of the *Istanbul Principles* and had made good progress overall in incorporating them into their own practices. However, the study also identified four out of the eight principles which the INGOs had found more challenging to implement. This section focuses on the ‘left behind’ principles by exploring relevant developments since the 2016. It sets out the main barriers to implementation for each principle; it identifies opportunities for moving forward informed by new examples of good practice; and it suggests ways for capitalising on any emerging opportunities and initiatives for the accelerated implementation of the effectiveness principles.

IP3 . Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation

“CSOs are effective as development actors when they ... support the empowerment and

inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development

initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized.”

The 2016 study found that although there was wide support for this principle among the INGO community and most organisations had adapted their practices in order to implement it, only just over half (56%) of respondents surveyed indicated their organisation directly engaged stakeholders in determining the INGOs’ own priorities. This signals there is more that INGOs can do to foster people’s empowerment and democratic ownership across all governance and decision-making levels.

Key barriers to implementation

- » INGOs own structures and procedures, partly set by donor expectations or internal governance models such as in INGO families, are not always geared to allow meaningful stakeholder participation and input to determine organisational priorities, especially at a higher strategic level.
- » Many INGO approaches still appear to be informed by the misconception that local actors, particularly in fragile states and humanitarian contexts, are characterised by weak capacity and limited contextual knowledge.
- » Public messaging by INGOs in the North contributes to perpetuate this misperception. Often driven by humanitarian crises, and within the context of dwindling public funding, INGOs themselves have been keen to suggest that solutions are cheap and easy. They have portrayed local people as victims and external agencies as 'saviours' inadvertently contributing to weak public understanding of development as empowerment. This affects both INGO programme priorities and approaches, as well as contributing to shape the attitudes of representatives in governance bodies, particularly those from the North.
- » An increased focus on compliance with donor requirements, coupled with tight programming timeframes, also limit the ability of INGOs to use participatory, bottom-up approaches empowering affected communities to genuinely set the agenda.
- » Stringent donor scrutiny and an emphasis on results have tended to accentuate INGOs' risk averseness, making them reluctant to engage in what might be considered high-risk activities or partnerships, and stifling their capacity to innovate.

Opportunities and examples of good practices

- » As outlined in Part 1 of the paper, there are numerous examples of people to people development initiatives and citizen-led networks buoyed by emerging digital technologies and social media. Rather than viewing these actors and initiatives as competitors in a tight civic space and operating landscape, if their agendas are aligned, INGOs should strive to support them by taking on a genuinely facilitating and empowering role.
- » Recent helpful adaptations to funding constraints experienced by INGOs have included extended inception periods for projects; dedicated funding for innovation and risk taking; flexible funding mechanisms including adequate allocations for capacity development; flexible approaches to monitoring and evaluation emphasising learning thus allowing INGOs to openly reflect on successes, failures and lessons learned.

CASE STUDY: People-Powered Decision Making (Greenpeace)²⁹

In 2017, Greenpeace teamed up with five other INGOs (350.org, BRAC, CIVICUS, Restless Development and TECHO) under the aegis of the Accountable Now platform and with the support of tech firm CPC Analytics to prototype ways in which they could integrate external activists – also referred to as changemakers - in campaign design in a data-driven, transparent, and more inclusive way making use of new digital technologies. In order to obtain a mix of qualitative and quantitative data from those changemakers, Greenpeace combined a set of digital tools – both traditional (e.g. online surveys) and newer ones (e.g. multimedia pinboard). In different formats, changemakers were then asked to contribute their perspective on the campaign design, strategies, and themes. Over the course of several months, a group of 50 changemakers from around the world and from different age groups provided input on two global campaigns run by Greenpeace. This pilot allowed the integration of a wider network of interested people into the 'core-business' of an advocacy INGO such as Greenpeace, helping ensure their campaigns are well-rooted in communities.

Way forward for accelerated implementation

- » Create countervailing perspectives and pressures for responsiveness by opening space for critical and articulate voices for Southern CSOs within internal programmatic and governance processes of INGOs.
- » Re-assess INGO business models and value chains in order to move away from top-heavy and top-down systems of international development and philanthropy towards a flatter and more equitable paradigm of people-based development.
- » Offer in-kind, strategic and financial resources to help upskill local actors to advance people to people initiatives and campaigns in the North and South.
- » Make use of INGOs' knowledge and experience to help broker citizens' participation in relevant national and international fora.

LEARNING QUESTIONS TO GUIDE INTERNAL DIALOGUE AND REFLECTION:

- » In your experience, what other barriers have prevented INGOs from making significant progress in putting in practice IP3 on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation since 2010?
- » What recent examples of good practice in fostering people's empowerment and democratic ownership can you think of?
- » What specific additional guidance would you give to INGOs trying to overcome the barriers to implementation of this IP that they have experienced so far?
- » How can your organisation engage in dialogue with donors at the national and international level in order to agree on the way forward to accelerate progress on IP3?
- » How can your organisation further harness the potential of digital transformation to accelerate progress on IP3?

IP4 . Promote environmental sustainability

“CSOs are effective as development actors when they ... develop and implement priorities and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future generations, including urgent responses to climate crises, with specific attention to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice.”

The 2016 study showed that although the majority (78%) of INGOs surveyed were supporting environmental sustainability through their programming, just over half, however, were applying the same principles to internal policies and practice and even fewer (44%) included it in their policy advocacy and campaigning strategies.

Key barriers to implementation

- » INGOs appear to still not be walking the talk on environmental sustainability as this is not consistently enshrined in organisational policies.
- » Climate resilience and adaptation are often seen and organised as a separate sphere of programming and advocacy from INGO on-going development programming and advocacy priorities. While there is a legitimate argument for climate finance to be additional, there is no programmatic rationale for it to be distinct from sustainable approaches in any given sector.

- » In some cases, this has caused inconsistencies in corporate social responsibility policies between and within INGOs leading to tensions over the acceptance of corporate funding. With growing private sector engagement in development cooperation and INGOs growing role in interventions resourced through climate finance it is likely these tensions will be accentuated.

Opportunities and examples of good practices

- » Climate action is currently experiencing a people-led renaissance. Inspired by the iconic Swedish girl Greta Thunberg and her climate strike, in 2018 thousands of people joined climate marches in a number of countries in 2018 calling for their governments to implement the Paris Agreement. In 2019, Thunberg's 'Fridays for Future' mobilised over a million children and youths across 100 countries who went on strike from school on 15th March 2019. In April 2019, climate activists from the citizen group Extinction Rebellion caused widespread disruption in London by staging various acts of civil disobedience. In the same month, as a result of growing action in the UK and worldwide, the UK Parliament was the first in the world to officially declare a climate emergency.
- » Environmental heavyweights like WWF and Greenpeace and many other CSOs have hailed Greta Thunberg, the Fridays for Future student movement and even climate activists from the UK Extinction Rebellion group as they have injected new vigour and urgency into the climate change debate galvanising public opinion and decision makers.
- » The growing momentum around climate change offers a very good opportunity for INGOs to accelerate progress on implementing IP4 on environmental sustainability.
- » For years, many INGOs have been putting in place environmental sustainability policies with a view to reducing their own environmental impact.
- » Some shared elements of good practices on environmental sustainability policies among INGOs are:
 - Setting targets for the use of energy and water;
 - Setting targets and offering facilities for reuse and recycling;
 - Sourcing sustainable office supplies, as well as maintenance and cleaning products;
 - Reducing air travel and encouraging more environmental modes of transportation for staff (e.g. providing staff subsidies and facilities to promote cycling, use of public transportation and car-pooling);
 - Encouraging flexible working and reducing face to face meetings and recruitment;
 - Choosing meeting locations with the level of greenhouse gas emissions in mind, hold alternative local and virtual events where possible, keeping meetings paperless;
 - Contributing to carbon offsetting programmes.

CASE STUDIES

Views from the Frontline³⁰ (VFL) 2019 is a forward-looking monitoring process that supports inclusive people-centred approaches to DRR (disaster risk reduction). It is designed to support the local implementation of the Sendai Framework for DRR and other people-centred aspects of the sustainable development and climate change frameworks. VFL remains the largest independent global review of disaster risk reduction at the local level. Established in 2009, VFL was implemented worldwide again in 2011 and 2013 and has gathered to date the views of more than 85,000 stakeholders across 129 countries. The latest report for 2019 provides a complementary bottom-up perspective on progress at the impact/outcome level to UNISDR's top-down Sendai Monitoring Tool establishing a local baseline and local monitoring process to measure progress towards achieving an inclusive "*people-centred*" approach to resilience-building.

CIVICUS³¹ are one of the organisations that have gone one step further by introducing environmental awareness training in order to enhance the implementation of their environmental policy. They have also introduced a set of 'Event Principles' including a section on sustainability and minimising harm to the planet. Tracking of carbon emissions has been included by CIVICUS as a key requirement when sourcing a new Travel Management System, to better monitor their environmental footprint³².

The Mundo-b³³ office building in Brussels (Belgium) is another example of how CSOs can act together to start walking the talk at home. A project for and by CSOs, Mundo-b (and its sister buildings Mundo-n in Namur and Mundo-j in Brussels European district) hosts 22 NGOs and social enterprises in an ecologically renovated office centre designed to limit their environmental impact as much as possible (energy, water, waste, mobility, biodiversity, reuse and recycling) while also offering shared meeting rooms, organic catering, and a didactic natural garden.

Way forward for accelerated implementation

Breaking down the silos between climate activists and development advocates in relation to development practice and development effectiveness principles, which should apply to climate finance as development finance. Build effective bridges in this regard with the environmental movement on climate finance advocacy on their part.

Mainstreaming environmental sustainability principles and standards into INGO performance management frameworks and as part of internal governance oversight.

Developing training tools informed by on-the-ground learning for integrating climate change sensitivity into all INGO programming and advocacy. <https://www.gndr.org/programmes/vfl/itemlist/category/168.html>

Incentivising INGOs and local CSOs to work closely together at the global level to jointly inform the UNFCCC follow-up process.

LEARNING QUESTIONS TO GUIDE INTERNAL DIALOGUE AND REFLECTION:

- » In your experience, what other barriers have prevented INGOs from making significant progress in putting in practice IP6 on equitable partnerships and solidarity since 2010?
- » What recent examples of good practice in fostering equitable partnerships can you think of?
- » What specific additional guidance would you give INGOs trying to overcome the barriers to implementation of IP6 on equitable partnerships and solidarity that they have experienced so far?
- » How can your organisation further harness the potential of digital transformation to accelerate progress on IP6?

IP5 . Practice transparency and accountability

"CSOs are effective as development actors when they ... demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations."

In 2016, the INGO study concluded that although most international organisations were accountable to donors and supporters, their "downward accountability" to the communities or the affected populations with whom they worked was weaker. Just over half of the study's respondents thought their organisation's policies enabled partners or affected populations to hold them accountable for their work (e.g. by sharing relevant information, ensuring meaningful participation at all stages of the programming cycle, and implementing safe and reliable mechanisms for receiving, managing and responding to complaints and other forms of feedback). Putting in practice this principle is intimately associated with the implementation of IP1 on people's empowerment and democratic ownership as well as IP6 on equitable partnerships.

Key barriers to implementation

- » Increased INGO transparency appears to be largely donor-driven rather than initiated by INGOs themselves. To date, three European governments, the UK, The Netherlands and Belgium, have made introduce mandatory rules for organisations receiving their aid to report their spending to IATI (International Aid Transparency Initiative).
- » Increased scrutiny, more stringent statutory requirements on INGOs and short timeframes of donor-funded programming have strengthened donor-centric accountability at the expense of “downward accountability” to local stakeholders.
- » Lower trust in INGOs following safeguarding and mismanagement scandals and their engagement in migration has further increased donor scrutiny of INGOs.

Opportunities and examples of good practices

- » The donor-led drive pushing INGO transparency through IATI has hastened since 2016 with The Netherlands joining the UK and Belgium in 2018 in introducing mandatory rules for ODA recipients on IATI publishing. Following the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, governments, multilateral institutions and other international organisations signed up to the Grand Bargain. This includes a commitment to publish timely, transparent, harmonised and open high-quality data on humanitarian funding within two years, and identifying IATI as the basis for a common standard.
- » Enhanced safeguarding and whistleblowing policies have been introduced in many INGOs following the recent sexual exploitation scandals that affecting a number of international organisations.
- » Since 2017, momentum has gathered in the INGO sector around the **Accountable Now** platform as a repository of innovative thinking and good practices on a holistic approach to what they view as ‘dynamic accountability’ and transparency. Accountable Now brings together 26 member INGOs active in over 150 countries worldwide. The platform is itself part of – and the secretariat to – the broader umbrella Global Standard for CSO Accountability, which is an initiative built up by nine well-established civil society accountability networks from Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean with the overarching aim to strengthen the effectiveness of CSOs worldwide by devising a collective Global Standard on CSO accountability. Adopted in 2017, this Global Standard centres on 12 Accountability Commitments capturing a globally shared, dynamic understanding of accountability, which is fully aligned with the Istanbul Principles. A Reporting and Assessment Framework accompanies the Accountability Commitments outlining what success looks like and how members of Accountable Now will be held to account.

CASE STUDY:

Restless Development Dynamic Accountability approach

Restless Development is leading the way in setting accountability and transparency standards in the INGO sector. Being an accountable agency for Restless Development means transparently working with and learning from young people and partners in order to increase their impact. On their website they boldly declare that “by turning our agency inside out and bringing more voices in, we believe this will lead to even greater impact for the young people, communities, partners and governments we work with. It will also increase the trust that others have in our agency and work, reinforcing the relationships and collaboration that drives our collective success”. Some of the key principles behind Restless Development’s Dynamic Accountability approach are:

- » Radical transparency: by sharing not just their results (finances, programme reports and evaluations) but also their ‘internal’ processes from policies and salaries to strategic thinking and board reports to manuals and information about their approach³⁴.
- » Two-way exchange: based on an interaction between the agency and its stakeholders. Only when organisations open up a two-way flow and discourse can openness and transparency bring in more voices into the leadership, governance and management of agencies, and ultimately making their work better.

- » Linking learning and performance: linking the voice, information and influence gained through dynamic accountability approach to organisational learning and performance systems.
- » Strategic alignment: Youth-led accountability is key to restless Development's work. Holding themselves to the same standards they demand of others.




Fig.3 – Restless Development's Dynamic Accountability approach

Way forward for accelerated implementation

- » Publishing to the full IATI Standard, including particularly the narrative fields, with links to relevant documentation, and at the activity level, while implementing measures to safeguard vulnerable partners.
- » CPDE INGO constituency group to formalise partnership with Global Standard for CSO Accountability given the significant synergies in supporting enhanced CSO accountability and the notable overlap in membership.
- » Strengthening feedback and complaints mechanisms and aim to improve transparency by publishing information and data on these systems including total numbers and types of complaints and data and details on open and resolved cases.

IP6 . Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity

“CSOs are effective as development actors when they ... commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship.”

The 2016 study identified the pursuit of equitable partnerships between INGOs and local partners as the one that many INGOs were finding most challenging to fully put into practice. As much as INGOs may aspire to play a different role within a changing development landscape, many have struggled to extricate themselves from the traditional development model in which they act as intermediaries and conduits for funding to local actors. Holding the purse strings still puts INGOs in a position of power with respect to their partners and very few INGOs truly aim to “dissolve” themselves.

Key barriers to implementation

- » Many larger INGOs are multi-mandate organisations and they increasingly operate in their countries in the North as well as in most developing countries in the South. This is causing increasing competition over scarce donor resources between INGOs and domestic CSOs. INGOs increased dependence on donor funding also contributes to skewing and limiting their strategic support of partners.
- » Compliance to donor regulations and conditionalities in many instances prevents INGOs from providing adequate core and sustainable funding to partners. Moreover, an exaggerated emphasis on risk avoidance and compliance may lead to some local partners being perceived as too risky by donors and therefore often by INGOs too.
- » The shift in discourse that has seen a change in the perception of INGOs by donors from partners to project implementers is not conducive to INGOs establishing equal partnerships with local partners, which are often still treated as sub-contractors.
- » INGOs' weak or inconsistent leadership skills, structures and internal planning cycles and mechanisms have failed to support adequate input from partners nurturing equitable partnerships.

Opportunities and examples of good practices

- » In 2014, INGOs and think tanks joined forces to shift the narrative towards 'doing development differently'³⁵ pushing a problem-driven or adaptive management agenda. This helped CSOs, development practitioners and decision-makers engage in a constructive dialogue to question the status quo while fostering a development effectiveness agenda.
- » In 2016, the Grand bargain built on this by promoting a localisation of humanitarian aid agenda. This has helped to set the scene for establishing more equitable partnerships between INGOs, local responders and southern actors.
- » Since then, other INGO-led initiatives setting shared values and codes of conduct for humanitarian action, like the START Network for example, have helped to put in practice the localisation agenda.

CASE STUDY:

Renewed Partnership Principles in the CBM Federation³⁶

Since 2017, the Christian federation CBM has deepened its engagement on partnership and accountability. In 2018, CBM adopted new partnership principles that aim to build on locally driven development agendas and ensure local ownership of projects. This is further reinforced by the application of participatory approaches at various stages of CBM's inclusive project cycle management. Sustainability is also central to CBM's partnership approach. Capacity assessment of (prospective) partner organisations is tied to capacity development planning throughout the lifetime of CBM's partnership with another organisation. Furthermore, since 2017 CBM has undergone efforts to deepen its understanding of sustainability by facilitating organisation wide webinars on the topic of responsible exit. This included sharing learning with other INGOs including OXFAM, WWF, and TLM. The outcomes of this learning process were included in a guidance note for staff. Finally, CBM has taken its ability to sustain project outcomes beyond the project cycle as a key indicator of success and in 2019 they plan to undertake ex-post evaluations of projects that have ended in order to generate learning for future programming.

Way forward for accelerated implementation

- » Significantly reduce direct country presence and develop instead negotiated partnership agreements with domestic CSOs, while working to increase their independent capacities for action.
- » Work proactively to support the New Deal agreement of 20% of humanitarian assistance through local CSOs by reducing direct action by INGOs and build local humanitarian capacities in advance of emergencies in priority countries for INGOs.

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CSOPartnership 
for Development Effectiveness

